Introduction
From its initial absence from the EEC Treaty, both formally and in practice, environmental policy has moved centre stage in the EC Treaty. In certain key respects, this development has been further strengthened by judgments of the European Court of Justice and by the European Union's international action in this field. Most recently, the Treaty of Amsterdam has altered the objectives of the Community, making the promotion of the core environmental concept of 'sustainable development' a central objective of the revised EC Treaty. In short, environmental law has now become a structured and embedded body of Community law, a development further reinforced by the extent to which, as a discipline, European environmental law and policy is now firmly on the academic map.
ii The purpose of this article is to examine this evolution, locating environmental law within the development of EC law more generally. In this context, however, we also consider the use of environmental law to further other objectives of the EU. Our focus, therefore, is the development and application of certain principles with an environmental heritagesustainable development, integration and subsidiarity. The current centrality of these principles in the EC Treaty tells a story of the absorption of the ideas and language of environmental policy into the core of the EU's constitution and policy formation processes: the 'ecologisation' of European governance. iii We also identify the application of concepts from the Community's traditional core areas of competence in social and economic matters to the environmental field, most notably citizenship, which has been tagged an example of the 'mainstreaming' of environmental policy. iv In considering these legal cross-currents, and law's part in furthering and strengthening ideas and values via principles, the main theme is the extent to which recent developments in EC environmental law pose new challenges to legal doctrines and to institutional structures which at present are only uneasily accommodated within existing frameworks. Most early, 'first-generation', Community environmental legislation arose immanently in response to economic law, flanking the market alongside social law. Its accommodation within EC law, legislatively and in judgments of the Court of Justice, v proved to be, on the whole, relatively unproblematic. vi A central reason behind the smoothness of this evolution was the emergence of Community environmental law, that is law aimed at the improved management of the environment and of natural resources and firmly anthropocentric in orientation, rather than the emergence at EC level of what might be termed ecological law, stressing the inter-relationship of humans and their natural environment. vii The recent borrowing of principles with an environmental heritage suggests that environmental law is further embedded in the EU's legal core. However, in this process the principles undergo some change in their role and content. Similarly, elements of citizenship may be 'greened', but not without significant broadening of the concept. In this sense, environmental law at EC level reflects many of the inherent limitations in regulating for positive environmental change, such as adequate representation of environmental interests and the capture of environmental values in decision-making. viii However, there are also limitations specific to the EC context, notably the inadequacy of an environmental agenda within undeveloped areas of EC law such as citizenship, notwithstanding that the EC provides a forum for the mediation of a range of conflicts relating to the balancing of environmental and other interests, primarily trade. We may therefore be entering a phase in which some of the limits of EC environmental law are being reached, and significant challenges to an 'environmental' approach emerging.
The article is broadly structured in three parts. In the next section, we outline what is meant by the European environment, as the subject of the body of Community environmental law. We examine the idea that 'the European Union's environment' (the working term of the European Environment Agency) is contestable ix -the environment is, after all, a many faceted, variable and uncertain thing -and consider the part played by law in the construction of this idea by highlighting various legal representations of the environment. The most important, for the purposes of this article, is the idea of the European environment as a common natural heritage which has currency as representative of a united and integrated Europe. Thereafter, the following three sections consider those principles and concepts with an environmental heritage, and the impact of their upward march within the EC Treaty regime. Finally, in what is a necessarily more speculative section, we consider some of the issues which arise when Community environmental law is examined under the lens of EU citizenship. reflected in several of the judgments of the European Court of Justice. This suggests that this environment -its boundaries, characteristics, inhabitants -is a given. This essentialist idea, however, belies considerable complexity and uncertainty.
Many different environments exist -urban, xiii wilderness, the indoor environment even xiv -and the environment might be understood or experienced on different spatial and temporal scales, xv with the added capacity to change, albeit slowly. xvi The terms of reference and methodology of the European Environment Agency can be seen as limiting, particularly its apparent failure to capture more complex, extended understandings of environment, shaped by culture and tradition. xvii Arguably, it is through appreciation of such understandings that a real and recognisable change in the quality of 'the environment' might be engendered. xviii Short of this, the approach taken continues to emphasise quantitative data, along which lines the Agency has recently published its first set of environmental indicators, xix a precursor to their elevation in the Community's Sixth Environmental Action Programme. xx It is worth stressing that the indicators being advanced at Community level go beyond air and water quality and other traditional environmental sectors such as waste management and ozone depletion to encompass indicators relating to key sectors of the economy and their integration: agriculture, energy, transport and industry (tourism being the one, notable, exception). xxi Nevertheless, the indicators are still environmental in the sense that they do not reach beyond environmental issues to try to capture more general 'sustainable development' indicators, the position recently taken in the UK (although these might be criticised as going too far in the direction of subjective 'quality of life' indicators and thus unduly relegating ecological considerations). xxii A more general difficulty with indicators is that even where there is agreement on the factors to be measured, agreeing on the seriousness of the problem is necessarily subjective. xxiii There are also difficulties with the idea of a European environment. 'Europe' is not an identifiable bioregion (a discrete natural region defined according to the lay of the land) xxiv and the physical boundaries of Europe are not settled because of the accession of new Member States, and the variability of the European Economic Area and the European Agreements. The future accession of Central and Eastern European states in particular will radically alter the territory of the EC (and is likely to multiply the sorts of environmental problems which followed the reunification of Germany).
xxv
There is also an element of extraterritoriality: for example, the European Environment Agency includes Norway and other states within its scope, recognising that for some purposes the 'European environment' extends eastwards to Belarus. xxvi The legal representation of the environment in the EC Treaty and secondary legislation has also been similarly limited and partial, in terms of its content and premises. Most significantly an anthropocentric agenda for environmental protection is pursued, so that the focus of EC environmental law is on protecting the health of humans and certain 'useful' or valued animals (whales, seal pups, and certain other (fur-producing) mammals) xxvii rather than protecting the environment for its own sake. This is seen by the legal marginalisation of the issue of eutrophication of waters, when compared to the emphasis placed on safe drinking water. xxviii And, more generally within water policy, a 'suitable for use' formulation has been the rule, combined with standards for various water uses, rather than rights or entitlements to water of a particular quality. xxix This agenda is also striking in the case of the Habitats Directive, xxx in which the destruction of a habitat for 'development' is provided for, so long as certain procedural requirements are fulfilled. xxxi This demonstrates clearly the institutional strains at work which force the institutions of the Community (and in particular the Court of Justice) to fit environmental problems into a human welfare framework.
The heritage of the anthropocentric agenda in the EC is in the emphasis on the 'Human Environment' in the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference in 1972 which prompted action on the part of the European Economic Community. Legal measures adopted under this Article were to attain 'in the course of the operation of the common market one of the objectives of the Community'. In the case of environmental measures, this objective was interpreted as improving the living and working conditions of the peoples of Europe. 'Purer' environmental objectives which were expressed in some of the early policy documents, action programmes, and legislation xxxv were therefore fitted within the constraints of, in policy terms, a conservative European Economic Community. Whilst ex Article 235 EEC (now Article 308 EC) has been regarded generally as an all-embracing legal base, 'a true locus of expansion ', xxxvi in the environmental field it restricted the type and content of legislation.
There are clearly gaps in the substantive law most notably in areas such as remedying the problem of historically contaminated land. xxxvii These might be attributed to subsidiarityrelated issues concerning the proper level of regulation. They might also be explained by reason of the importance of Member States' control over land and energy, as symbols of sovereignty and self-sufficiency, xxxviii although there is a qualification in that EC environmental law acts upon those areas of the environment which are perceived as least economically vital, typically nature conservation. Even allowing for these explanations, however, certain omissions in EC environmental law derived from its anthropocentric orientation underlie the central philosophical and political distinction between 'environmentalists' who adopt a technicist and often managerial stance towards the environment and 'ecologists' who view human activities as embedded in nature, and bioregions as determinative of action, government, and law. xxxix Although the distinction between the two extremes is often exaggerated, it is important to recognise that, in its purpose, content, and scale, EC environmental law is an implicit rejection of ecological thought. This might be supported by reference to limited legislative action so far in areas such as strategic environmental assessment, providing for an assessment of the environmental effects of certain plans and programmes (but not policies).
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The scope of EC environmental law may also be illustrated by the reasons on which regulation is premised. Alongside economic spillovers and the pursuit of a 'level playing field' across the Community, the transboundary movement both of pollutants and of pollution was a key justification for early community law.
xli
In recognising the irrelevance of borders in such cases, the 'environment' acted as a symbol for the advantages of joint action in Europe; the environmental agenda corresponding well with the idea of the EU 'as a polity which transcends state boundaries'. xlii More recently, a greater sensitivity to actual cross-border dimensions to environmental harm and its regulation is emerging, evidenced for example by cross-frontier consultation requirements now contained in revisions to the leading directives on environmental impact assessment, ambient air quality assessment and management, and the control of major accident hazards, and in the water framework directive.
xliii With a different emphasis, however, EC environmental law is now developing the idea of shared heritage of the European environment. This is a more complex but possibly firmer foundation for environmental law than the regulation of transboundary pollutants and pollution. It has found expression not merely in legislation but also in judgments of the Court of Justice. The shift towards a more inclusive, less functional premise for environmental law may first be seen in cases in which the Court's interpretation of air quality Directives had the effect of giving individual citizens a right to clean air. xliv This has been lauded as the first stirrings of a public environmental 'trust', xlv although in a limited form for enforcement purposes rather than as part of a broader citizenship agenda. In this respect, the Court pursued an ecological objective, but this is not the general approach of the EU. More important is the Court's broadening of the language of the Directive, which speaks of 'such species … constitut[ing] a common heritage'. The Court may here reflect a widening of the language of commonality found in the preamble to the Habitats Directive ('the threatened habitats and species form part of the Community's natural heritage') l and more broadly the absorption of the concept of 'commons' from international environmental law. Pursuing this idea in Lappel Bank, the Court spoke the language of integration -of common ownership of a Europe without borders in a real sense and common responsibilities. This idea, in law, of shared ownership of the European environment, is central to its legitimating force. The Court appears reluctant, however, to refer to commonality in relation to other environmental resources.
li This may be indicative of the problematic limits of a shared ownership approach to integration, some of which are addressed by recourse to the principle of sustainable development.
Sustainable development
Following the Treaty of Amsterdam, the international principle of sustainable development now forms part of the Community's raison d'être in Article 2 EC: 'Determined to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into account the principle of sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market'. The principle has also been added to the Treaty on European Union so that amongst the objectives of the Union is now listed: 'to promote economic and social progress and to achieve balanced and sustainable development '. lii The principle therefore provides a foundation for EC action in general rather than a more limited field of application, the formation of environmental law and policy.
The principle of sustainable development can be traced to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, but gained currency in the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the 'Brundtland Report') which defined it as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs '. liii The inclusion of sustainable development in the EC Treaty thereby introduces for the first time an intergenerational element into EC law. The centrality of the principle in the Union's treaties may be seen primarily as a response to the Member States adopting sustainable development as a guiding principle in national legislation and policy documents, thereby discharging their obligations under international law. liv It is also a testament to the persistent and effective lobbying by bodies such as Greenpeace International, the Institute for European Environment Policy, the European Environmental Bureau, Friends of the Earth and WWF (formerly the World Wide Fund for Nature). lv Although its firm position in the EC legal order suggests some consensus about its meaning and significance, sustainable development is a deeply contested concept. lvi This is not least because of the 'business as usual' philosophy, expressed in the Brundtland Report lvii and close association with 'environmental modernisation' in which an efficiency oriented approach is pursued, and economic and environmental interests are purportedly integrated into decision-making in such so-called 'win-win' solutions. In other words, this is an approach which sees environmental protection as less of a threat to the economy than an opportunity, and advocates the integration of environmental factors and interests into broader decisionmaking, so far at the cost of a more overtly ecological approach. as making a contribution to the general objective of sustainable development) the Advocate General considers that sustainable development 'emphasises the necessary balance between various interests which sometimes clash, but which must be reconciled'. This assisted in reaching the conclusion that in deciding which sites to propose or when defining the boundaries of such sites for the purposes of the Habitats Directive, the Commission (in agreement with the Member States) must assess the interests concerned, ascertaining whether human activities in the area may be reconciled with the objective of biodiversity conservation. While the Court was able to dispose of the case on narrower grounds without discussing sustainability, this view represents a considerable departure from the ECJ's case law on the Wild Birds Directive which consistently held that only objective ornithological criteria could be used in designating bird habitat sites for protection. it has particular significance in the environmental field. This is because of the environmentalist's argument that environmental protection requirements should necessarily form part of all areas of life.
lxxvi Integration therefore provides a mechanism whereby the linkages between the social, economic and environmental spheres, identified by sustainable development, may be acted upon.
lxxvii Even in the absence of an integration principle, the Community has for some time been regarded as a space for the important integration of valued objectives. Most notably, there were relatively early attempts at integrating environmental considerations into regional policy, although these are still the subject of fierce criticism. There, the Court of Justice held that a national legislative measure prohibiting the keeping on a Danish island of a species of bee other than the native subspecies must be regarded as justified, under Article 30 EC, on the ground of the protection of the health and life of animals, thus elevating biodiversity conservation through protection of the life of potentially affected species. However, the judgment goes further still by allowing trade-related protection for local colonies of species regardless of whether such a colony might be deemed a distinct species or subspecies. So long as the population affected has characteristics distinguishing it from others, this makes it worthy of protection, not merely from a scientific perspective but perhaps also for its cultural significance. Cases such as Bluhme highlight that the Court at least provides a unified forum for the resolution of conflicts between trade and environment, even if its rules on standing still serve to exclude certain environmental voices lxxxi and the actual resolution of trade and environmental objectives remains elusive. The Treaty of Amsterdam further enhanced the principle by elevating it to a general principle of the EC Treaty, banishing any view that it applied only to 'other [explicitly mentioned] Community policies', and twinning it with sustainable development. lxxxvi Although undoubtedly strengthened over time (suggesting that it has been seen as increasingly significant, or, perhaps, in need of clarification), the forms of integration relate mainly to the integration of policy areas and the promulgation of 'horizontal' or cross-media legislation. A legal analysis of the principle, however, suggests that integration is primarily a procedural requirement. there is an expanding number of discussion documents that pertain to 'integrate' the environment into other policy areas. These adopt either a bilateral approach to integration (i.e., the integration of `the environment' into a specific sector), xciii or, increasingly, a multilateral approach whereby more complex and complete patterns of co-operation are evolving. xciv Elsewhere, it has led to a range of institutional developments such as designated environmental liaison officials in other Directorates-General, in effect a lukewarm version of the Greening Government initiative in the UK.
xcv Legislation with an avowedly integrationist intent has ensued. One recent example is Regulation 1257/99 on support for rural development xcvi which, by strengthening agrienvironmental measures, attempts to integrate environmental concerns into the Common Agricultural Policy under the Agenda 2000 reform process. However, such reforms should perhaps be seen as performing a legitimating function for the purpose of excluding, or 'greenboxing', agricultural grants and subsidies from the purview of the World Trade Organisation. A further category of integrationist measure relates not to the internal procedures of the Community institutions, but rather aims to more fully integrate decision making in the Member States. The Directive on project-based environmental assessment is an early example. A more fully developed approach to assessment is taken in the recent proposals on strategic environmental assessment, noted above.
xcvii
In similar vein, attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam is a Declaration xcviii that 'the Commission undertakes in its proposals, and that the Member States undertake in implementing those proposals, to take full account of their environmental impact and of the principle of sustainable growth'. However, this falls some way short of a requirement that impact assessment be carried out and is notable for its reference to 'growth' rather than 'development'.
Elsewhere, the Directive on integrated pollution prevention and control offers an example of the advantages and potential scope of an integrated approach. xcix As well as rejecting a media-based approach to pollution control, which is itself the antithesis of an integrated approach, the Directive reflects a recognition that integrated pollution control requires the regulation of 'inputs' as well as 'outputs', namely energy and natural resources, giving it certain qualities relating as much to environmental management as to environmental protection. The inclusion of some agricultural processes within the Directive's scope further suggests some progression towards a more holistic approach to the environment. A similarly holistic approach is also evident in the Water Framework Directive ci , which links water quality and quantity objectives, although takes an insufficiently integrated approach, e.g., energy consumption in meeting water quality standards is not addressed.
There has therefore been much action in terms of documentation and some notable examples of directives taking an integrationist approach. cii But, taking a broad view, there are few identifiable, 'hard' consequences of the principle in terms of decision making. The decision to proceed with the completion of the internal market, without any rigorous examination of the likely effects on the environment, ciii is one example, such that the policy decisions on the bolsters to the single market, such as the trans-European network, may be seen as examples of profound 'disintegration'. civ Perhaps most significant is research that suggests that the moves towards greater integration of policy areas can actually lead to marginalisation of the environmental agenda, and non-environmental interests and considerations influencing environmental interests as much as vice versa. cv Arguably, the proliferation of integration duties may weaken the concept such that the environment loses any distinctive legal status in the Treaty. 
Subsidiarity
The third principle we consider in the context of the greening of EU governance is subsidiarity, a version of which was included in the Environmental Title following the Single European Act cvii before the principle gained more general legal currency at Maastricht. Like other provisions of the SEA relating to the environment, however, the insertion of a
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Published version available in '20 Yearbook of European Law 139-171' -9 -subsidiarity-type provision confirmed and legitimated existing practice, in this case entrenching (albeit to a limited extent) an existing sensitivity to questions of scale. Thus, the First Environmental Action Programme referred to five possible levels of action -local, regional, national, European, international -and the need 'to establish the level best suited to the type of pollution and to the geographical zone to be protected'.
cviii Of course, for some Member States at least, the initial insertion of a subsidiarity-type provision in the EEC Treaty was to prevent an undesirable extension of Community competence rather than anything with wider impact. cix The more general subsidiarity provision inserted at Maastricht reflects a concern with the appropriate level of decision-making. This, as with the version of subsidiarity originally contained in Article 130r(4) of the EEC, again juxtaposes Community and Member State action, using 'effectiveness' as its true measure. cx Necessarily this has implications for values related to processes rather than outcomes. cxi Thus while there are a number of provisions of EC environmental law which require or promote a measure of public involvement, a difficulty is that this occurs against a background in which procedural values are fundamentally downplayed. cxii A further implication is that the approach in Article 5 EC (ex Article 3b), which conspicuously eschews the citizen-centred approach to subsidiarity taken in Article 1 of the TEU (ex Art. A), blocks out an important conceptual space for the ecological citizen, avoiding consideration of the local or the 'domestic' as worthy of Treaty-based protection. cxiii In any event, the fluid boundaries of environmental law, and in particular moves to integrate environmental concerns into other policy sectors, pose a particular challenge to the idea of a strict division between exclusive and shared competence. cxiv This is further complicated by the difficulty, in the environmental sphere as elsewhere, of drawing sharp distinctions between the local and the global and all points in between.
In addition, continuing attention to effectiveness of outcome clashes not merely with other valuable aspects of regulation, such as process values, but also with the realities of existing EC environmental law. Many new environmental measures move away from traditional 'command and control' regulation and are difficult to judge on normal 'effectiveness of outcome' grounds.
Recent amendments to the Directive on environmental impact assessment, for example, retain its procedurally-focused mechanisms based on preventing adverse environmental impact at source, although the Directive is not directly assessed against this objective, either quantitatively or qualitatively. While the pace of new environmental legislation undoubtedly slowed following completion of the internal market, and some inert proposals were, for the time being, withdrawn, the greatest impact has been the subtle reorientation of new proposals towards greater flexibility. This is seen most clearly in the exercise of discretion, primarily at national level, and both legislatively and judicially: changes to the form and intensity of legislation, and a greater willingness to apply and interpret this flexibly and to bolster this approach through a preference for decentralised enforcement methods. cxviii Nevertheless, the general endurability of existing EC environmental legislation and proposals for new law is striking. Central to this have been the pre-existing twin sensitivities to issues of scale in decisionmaking, as well as leaving the details of the balancing of environmental and other objectives to the Member States. cxix More specifically, many directives identified as requiring simplification in the postMaastricht period (especially those relating to air and water quality standards) have been renewed or are close to revision, albeit that they are subject in differing respects to
Published version available in '20 Yearbook of European Law 139-171' -10 -subsidiarity. For example, there has been some shift in the Directive on drinking water quality towards regulating only for essential quality and health-related parameters, while Member States are to be given greater flexibility in monitoring water quality.
cxx Current thinking on amending the Directive on bathing waters might, for the first time, make distinct provision for different waters depending on natural differences in, e.g., pH, turbidity and salinity, requiring standards to be set with respect to what is 'normal', which will vary across the Community. cxxi This approach would take differences in environmental assimilative capacities seriously while, in theory, providing for common minimum health and amenity standards. And in relation to air quality, the adoption of the Directive on ambient air quality assessment and management cxxii has put to rest concerns that the Community had, by the mid-1990s, abandoned, at least temporarily, recourse to quality objectives in this sector in favour of emissions standards, seemingly because of the greater flexibility afforded by process-based controls.
cxxiii In addition, controversial provisions of existing Directives in these key policy areas have, for a range of reasons, endured. These include the background presence of international commitments or exhortatory standards, such as the role of World Health Organisation standards in guiding drinking water and air quality law, but probably also include the impact of the precautionary principle in entrenching existing provisions of environmental legislation which might not otherwise remain. Finally, renewed commitment to existing policy areas involves little risk of losing symbolic capital. Similarly, new legislation has been adopted, or proposals remain active, in every key area where, post-Maastricht, at least some Member States were actively hostile to legislative development. While generalisations are problematic, some trends seem to emerge. Firstly, minimum harmonisation remains the preference, while the scope for Member States to maintain or adopt higher national standards will, in practice, increase. cxxx Linked with this, genuinely 'framework' directives have yet to emerge, although the Water Framework Directive will alter this. (Whilst its pursuit of water quality of 'good ecological status' may prove elusive, its problematic approach combining emissions and quality standards cxxxi is accompanied by a no deterioration provision which, in principle, should mean no weakening of existing provisions.) A continued use of framework directives in the sense of 'umbrella' directives providing a general basis for more detailed controls, however, can be seen in the air quality sector, with 'daughter' directives finally emerging. This approach looks to physical environmental features rather than situatedness or 'closeness to the citizen'. Further, a divergence is emerging in relation to measures requiring the designation of sites and the application of protective regimes for pollution control therein, an approach traditionally seen as something of a halfway house between emission and target standards. This is the approach taken under the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive, under which areas sensitive to sewage effluent discharge must be designated and the courts have given Member States little discretion is doing so. In another area the Court of Justice continues to deliver fairly strongly worded judgments on the designation of conservation areas, including important judgments on the sufficiency of a Member State's overall designation. Thus the jurisprudence of the Court in relation to sites of conservation importance has moved Finally in this context, there is a continued resistance to transferring inspection and day-today enforcement powers to the EC level. In part this is because of the loss of symbolic capital involved cxl but no doubt it is also for the more pragmatic reason that EC-level inspection and enforcement may simply be too challenging a task. Instead, the onus has so far been placed on other mechanisms and institutions such as the role of the European Environment Agency (in gathering information) and the EC Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL) (which promotes the exchange of information and expertise between regulators with a view to developing greater consistency in enforcement). There is the prospect, however, of a Recommendation on minimum criteria for environmental inspections which would require Member States to draw up plans covering both routine monitoring of industrial activities regulated under Community environmental law, and non-routine follow-up inspections. Finally, subsidiarity as a legal concept both fails to resolve fundamental issues about the allocation of responsibility and, as importantly, the framing of the kinds of questions that determine such decisions. cxlvii While there have been improvements in the direction of wider public consultation on certain proposals, experience has been mixed. 
Citizenship
In this section, we consider the extent to which EC environmental law might be conceptualised within a framework drawn from the EU's nascent attempt to carve out a European concept of citizenship. -12 -which EC law has begun to construct the EC 'environmental' citizen by the use of existing approaches and incremental development of generally-accepted citizenship claims. Attempts to develop the European environmental citizen, notably in relation to public participation, have often been driven by the need for greater enforcement of existing EC environmental law, long-recognised as a serious weakness.
cliv Furthermore, bolder proposals in this area, such as the formal entrenching of environmental 'rights' at the EU level, are addressed only at one understanding of the 'environmental' citizen. By contrast, a more radical conception of 'ecological' citizenship may be advanced.
'Environmental' Citizenship
On the surface, there is little within the present formulation of citizenship as a concept of EU law that touches upon human-environment relations. At best, perhaps, citizenship suggests either a restricted, residual view of the 'market citizen', clv or of a political citizen enjoying political rights through bonds of residence and not mere nationality. On either approach, the interaction between the EU citizen and their environment is either indirect, through the market, or through a specific place or nation-centred participation in political life. We can, however, consider EC environmental law by looking at various tendencies suggested by the concept of citizenship. Although the legal status of the Charter has yet to be determined, the only explicit mention of the environment adds nothing to the approach already taken in Article 6 EC and no mention is made of environmental rights per se. clxv However, it must be doubted whether a legal right to environment, perhaps of the kind found in many national constitutions of Member States and accession countries, would operate at anything more than a policy level or provide anything more than symbolic capital. While the European Court of Human Rights has, in extreme cases, worked creatively with the European Convention on Human Rights to provide remedies for flagrant instances of environmental injustice, it has done so necessarily within existing categories of the protection of rights and freedoms.
clxvi It remains to be seen whether abstractlyformulated 'rights' in the context of the environment are useful, not least in relation to issues such as climate change and biodiversity conservation. By contrast to humanconstructed concepts such as freedom of trade or the right to equal treatment and freedom from discrimination, the environment is both a social construct and a practical reality; necessarily, our interaction with the environment, in its infinite variety of forms and qualities, means a weighting of complex economic, social and cultural values in the setting of environmental standards. clxvii As discussed above, so long as the objective is the integration of environment and economics through sustainable development, this requires some degree of resolution, rather than the 'trump' character of rights.
Legislatively, there appears to be a modest expansion of procedural rights. While access to EU documents is now provided for at Treaty level, show an incremental enhancement of rights to information and participation. In the case of the latter, for example, Member States are now required proactively to publicise information relating to the more hazardous installations covered. Moreover, access to information (rather than merely access to documents) for any natural or legal person who so requests it follows the approach taken in the Directive on environmental information.
clxx However, there is no fundamental change of approach from this Directive, namely to view procedural rights as facilitating enforcement, or at best enhancing transparency, rather than providing anything more free-standing.
clxxi These developments do little to challenge the framing of the EC's democratic difficulties primarily as questions of the balancing of power between the institutions rather than as about the relationship of 'citizens' to these institutions.
clxxii There are some signs of a greater role for citizen-type involvement in EC decision-making, such as the emergence of limited attempts to foster an environmental civil society through EC funding for environmental NGOs operating at the European level.
clxxiii Again, though, such funding may primarily assist the Commission, at least indirectly, in its enforcement role. In the same vein, the recent White Paper on Environmental Liability foresees a role for environmental NGOs, but only as a surrogate enforcement agency, generally where official action is not forthcoming.
clxxiv Where environmental NGOs have been given participatory rights at the level of EC decision-making, in practice these may be drowned out by the sound of industrial voices enjoying considerable numeric and other advantages.
clxxv Eventual implementation of the recently concluded 1998 Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, though, may alter this significantly, providing a procedural complement to the more substantively-oriented but less environmentallyrelevant ECHR. But so far the environmental citizen, while demonstrably active across Europe (as evidenced by direct action style protest) is generally a passive voice in EC environmental law and policy.
clxxvi Perhaps the most interesting tangible developments in relation to environmental citizenship are taking place at judicial level. It is notable that the report of the European Court of Justice to the 1996 IGC specifically linked citizenship with its earlier creation of directly effective rights, suggesting that citizenship is to be seen substantively rather than merely in terms of procedural guarantees of political participation.
clxxvii As with legislative action, however, the underlying concern with ensuring greater enforcement is being reflected in a drift away from the view that Community legislation will only be reviewable under the direct effect doctrine where there is detriment to an individual right. Thus, in two cases concerning the Directive on environmental assessment, the Court has held that what matters is the obligation on the Member State (or its competent authorities or even its courts) to take all the appropriate measures to ensure that the Directive is faithfully implemented in practice and that any discretion that a Member State has is not unduly exceeded. In the Kraaijeveld case, clxxviii a case concerning the lack of assessment of the environmental effects of constructing dykes, the Court held that the Member States' discretion in implementing the Directive in practice did not preclude judicial review of the question whether this discretion had been exceeded. The Court emphatically directed national courts to examine national legislation to see whether the legislative authorities have remained within the limits of their lawful discretion. The courts could therefore be obliged to set aside national legislation going beyond the limits of that discretion where they were bound to review the legality of national decision-making on their own motion. National authorities must then take all the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the Directive. Writing extra-judicially about Kraaijeveld, at least one member of the Court (Judge Edward) has tried to make it clear that this did not mean that the Court found this part of the environmental assessment Directive to be directly effective, or confer individual rights (thus ruling out Francovich claims). In the more recent Bozen case, clxxx the Court was asked to consider a challenge to a decision not to require an impact assessment for redevelopment at Bolzano airport. The project would have changed the use of the airport from military to civilian and cargo flights, requiring some new development and intensifying effects from things like noise. The Court followed the Kraaijeveld case in holding that the key test in relation to such projects was whether they were likely to have significant environmental effects because of their size, nature or location, and did not explore the issue as to whether the applicants had any right to bring the case. Thus, while not holding that the Directive conferred directly effective rights on individuals where an authority in a Member State had exceeded its discretion, the Court provided a remedy for the applicants by, in effect, looking to the legality of the national decision-making procedure and the extent to which this, if unchecked, would detract from the effective implementation of the Directive.
Opinions differ on what is happening here. For some, following Judge Edward's lead, the Court is constructing a new remedy through which non-implementation of directives can be checked without opening up the possibility of state liability claims (termed by one commentator 'public law effect').
clxxxi For others, the better view would probably be to see this as an expansion of the direct effect doctrine, in part because of the practical difficulties in giving effect to any wider public law effect doctrine.
clxxxii In practical terms, however, the result is little different; the notion that an individual right must be infringed for a provision to be directly effective, and that a right based on the protection of human health, or compensation for economic loss arising from environmental 'harm', must be at stake (as against, say, 'interests' relating to nature conservation) clxxxiii would seem to be being replaced by judicial mechanisms which look more towards the administrative duty that has been breached rather than the personal interests at stake.
clxxxiv What is clear is that concerns about non-implementation of Community environmental law have driven the Court of Justice away from a narrow, rights-based citizenship-type agenda, expanding at the same time the concept of environmental citizenship, although still from an enforcement perspective.
A possible motivation behind the Court of Justice's approach appears to be self-interest in preventing an expansion in the workload of the Court in new areas. This is seen most clearly in the test for 'direct and individual concern' in Article 230 EC (ex Article 173), which the European Courts continue to interpret restrictively against individuals and environmental organisations, an interpretation which, perversely, operates so that the more widespread the environmental harm the stronger is the bar on legal recourse before the European Courts. This is the conclusion from Stichting Greenpeace Council, a challenge to the grant of regional assistance for the construction of two power stations in the Canary Islands.
clxxxv The dilemma might also be seen as an attempt on the part of the Court to fit broad environmental concerns ('of general interest') into a tightly defined legal category, originally drawn up with the protection of discrete and individualised financial interests in mind. Nevertheless, the dissonance between seeking greater involvement of individuals and groups in the legislative process, whilst privileging the rights of only some of these participants in relation to the judicial interpretation or protection of the deals agreed, is striking, and of doubtful consistency with the requirements of the Århus Convention.
clxxxvi Outside of direct effect, the Court continues to be conspicuously inactive in the creative development of the procedural and participatory protections for individuals and groups seen elsewhere.
clxxxvii In practice, a further, related, difficulty, is that while a significant proportion (around one third) of ongoing enforcement action by the Commission relates to the environment, the Court is called upon comparatively rarely to rule on preliminary references in environmental matters, and when it does so these tend to be in cases brought by commercial rather than environmental concerns. 
Towards 'Ecological' Citizenship?
Like citizenship generally, environmental citizenship has tended to be conceptualised in terms of the claiming of entitlements in the public sphere. These may be procedural rights of the kind discussed above, or more substantive rights to an environment of a 'clean', 'decent' or 'healthy' quality, framed anthropocentrically for humans.
clxxxix Theoretically, the exercise is often seen as expanding citizenship claims outwards from civic, political and social rights to 'third-generation' solidarity or collective rights such as environmental rights. Because EC law is an implicit rejection of ecological thought, however, an ecological perspective on citizenship arguably leads not to a 'mainstreaming' of EC environmental law but rather provides a 'disruptive challenge to traditional notions of citizenship', one which looks 'outside the city, beyond the public, and further afield than the nation-state'. cxc Various possibilities flow from taking an ecological citizenship perspective which, taking a duties-centred approach, is not based on a contract between the state and its members. cxci Rather, we might consider EC environmental law as positing a conception of ecological citizenship neither wedded to the nation-state in space nor in time, nor wholly concerned with activities in the public sphere. Clearly, such an ecological citizenship poses a challenge even to the conceptions of citizenship that can be derived, immanently, from existing political, economic and social rights at EU level.
Initially, a duties-based approach is increasingly being pursued by commentators frustrated at attempts at ascribing environmental rights (and also 'rights to the environment' itself). cxcii Moreover, duties-centred approaches can be found in some national constitutions of Member States, including duties both on individuals (e.g., the Spanish Constitution) and on government (e.g., the Dutch Constitution)). From an ecological perspective, a duties-based approach emphasises a degree of virtue, and an attitude towards the natural environment, and avoids any necessary connection with rights. By definition, environmental duties, owed across physical and spatial borders, cannot be based on reciprocity.
cxciii As far as law is concerned, three issues emerge in relation to duties. We might ask to whom a particular duty is owed, since this will be important for enforcement. Who has the correlative right to any duty placed either on the Commission or the Member States or on individuals? In Enichem Base, for example, the Court of Justice held that the Commission, not the Member State, had the correlative right in respect of reporting obligations in the waste framework Directive. cxciv However, it has been queried whether the same approach should be taken in a situation similar to that in the Stitching Greenpeace case, at least if the geographic nexus is sufficient to establish a right. cxcv Further, there may be greater flexibility in relation to transposing duties than rights; an obligation to prohibit an environmentally-damaging activity can generally be transposed either by criminal, civil or administrative mechanisms, and even within any of these categories there will generally be flexibility as to the degree of obligation, e.g., as between strict or fault-based liability. Finally, EC law can, directly or indirectly, regulate or stimulate private behaviour. There is, after all, much in the belief that 'from an ecological point of view, good citizenship is learnt in private, not in public'. cxcvi At least insofar as there is freedom in the domestic sphere (e.g., consumption and disposal) good ecological behaviour may be learnt in the private realm. EC law may further this aspect of ecological citizenship to the extent that such areas (waste; product labelling) are sites of legitimate EC involvement.
In relation to space, loosening the bonds between the citizen and the nation-state poses many of the same issues as the subsidiarity and flexibility debates, namely the legitimate extent of involvement in environmental and related affairs across Member State borders. cxcvii Some strides have been made here, such as the revised Directive on environmental impact assessment which requires public consultation within other Member States which may experience significant environmental effects from developments outwith In general terms, there is much of an ecological nature that could usefully emerge from a European public space. cci A further approach is through the concept of a common European natural heritage, discussed above. Although complex, the development of this concept may parallel the case of the free movement of persons in so far as there is evident a similar process of freeing legal action from an economic trigger in the interests of higher, aspirational ideas of citizenship arising from deeper integration in Europe. In a similar manner, we can see the flourishing of a more autonomous body of environmental law which, although bounded by economic considerations, is not attached umbilically to the single market. Ideas of a common natural heritage in Europe, whose articulation is symbolic and marginal to the conservation directives it underpins, ccii ought therefore to elevate the relationship between community and environment to a higher plane, in the process creating a more direct connection between individuals and the environment. Without suggesting that such an approach is free from difficulties, articulated and generally accepted ecological duties, cciii owed non-specifically across space and time, might avoid some of the difficulties inherent in what has been coined the 'psychic spillover' justification to EC environmental law, whereby issues of 'mere' concern to citizens in one Member State might justify regulating action in other Member States. 
Conclusion
European environmental law contributes to the construction of its subject by defining 'the environment' and drawing its boundaries; in this process it universalises its subject matter and plays an important symbolic role in the process of European integration. According to the Treaty, and increasingly in practice, sustainable development now provides the organising idea, or central reference point, not just for environmental law and policy but for all Community activities.
Further legal principles (integration primarily, but also subsidiarity ccv ) elaborate and give further expression to it. From a legal point of view, the process of 'mainstreaming' sustainable development and the other associated principles may lead to the application of legal doctrines and principles from social and economic policy areas to the environmental field. However, invoking law for environmental protection still raises problems peculiar to it. The broader issue is that, whilst locating principles of environmental law within mainstream EC law may provide a functional fit with the requirements of sustainable development, the essential and unique quality of environmental concern and thought might be lost, not the least of which are concerns relating to process and to identity which even the evolution of a type of European 'environmental' citizenship may neither capture nor replace. * School of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London ** Faculty of Laws, University College London.
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xii European Environment Agency, Report on the European Environment at the Turn of the Century, n 10 above, 2. This Report provides an assessment of the 'development of environmental quality in the EU in the near future, i.e. 2010'. The forecasts of environmental quality in various sectors, for example greenhouse gases and climate change, hazardous substances, soil degradation and 'water stress' are summarised by means of icons, showing either smiley faces, non-smiley faces or frowns. Each of the sectors listed above are portrayed by 'frowns'. Scientist (1999) , 1 (Inside Science) xvii A more tentative, but possibly more valuable, meaning may be suggested: '"Environment" is ... whatever surrounds or, to be more precise, whatever exists in the surroundings of some being that is relevant to the state of that being at a particular place and time. The "situatedness" of a being and its internal conditions and needs have as much to say about the definition of environment as the surrounding conditions themselves, while the criteria of relevance can also vary widely.' Harvey, n 15 above, 118. xxiv According to ideas of bioregionalism, the jurisdictions of national, and supranational governments match poorly with these areas, and so makes environmental governance difficult. That 'Europe' is not a single bioregion should create similar difficulties, however, in a contradictory fashion, European environmental policy has relied on the fit between the transboundary nature of environmental pollution and cross-border controls for its legitimacy. (OJ 1980, L20/43) , which extends to indirect discharges to groundwater from disposal or tipping, only applies prospectively (Art. 5). The Commission's 1996 waste strategy expressed the view that remediation of such sites should be a matter primarily for the Member States (COM(96)399).
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